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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The remote seller in the principal case, although a casual
seller, has some of the characteristics of these other types of
sellers. A manufacturer may be held liable because he created
the defect. The seller here also created the defect by an overt
act. On this basis he could be liable. An habitual seller has
considerable knowledge concerning the product he sells. The
seller here, who was engaged in the business of renting cars,
probably had the same degree of knowledge as an habitual
seller.15 He did not, however, have the same volume of sales as
the habitual seller. The seller here bears a closer resemblance
to a building contractor in that his sales are less frequent. It
has been suggested that the main reason for holding the manu-
facturer liable is that his volume of sales is great enough to
allow him to distribute the loss to a large segment of the public
by a slight price increase.26 This reason also applies to liability
of habitual sellers. If the significant fact in determining the
liability of a seller is his volume of sales, then the decision of
the court in the principal case is correct in view of the small
number of sales made by this defendant. If, however, the loss
distribution motivation is not controlling, the decision is erron-
eous in light of the extension of the liability of sellers of defec-
tive products to provide increased consumer protection.
TORTS--TRADE SECRETS-NECESSITY OF CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIP
Smith v. Dravo Corporation, 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
Smith designed and manufactured a novel freight container.
After his death, Dravo Corporation became a prospective buyer
of his business and during negotiations received detailed infor-
mation from his executor concerning the construction of the
container. Dravo decided against the purchase, but, shortly there-
after, marketed a freight container which was almost identical
to that which had been designed and produced by Smith. Smith's
executor brought an action to enjoin Dravo Corporation from
15. The UNIFORMi COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-104, 2-314 (1952), provides for
greater liability on implied warranty grounds for those having special
knowledge of the product sold than for those not having such knowledge.
16. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453 461-468, 150 P.2d 436,
440-444 (1944) (concurring opinion). See Gregory, TWespass to Negligence
to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Rnv. 359, 382-384 (1951).
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manufacturing this type of freight container, claiming defendant
had wrongfully obtained and used Smith's trade secret. The
district court found for the defendant. On appeal, the court of
appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and held that
a trade secret which defendant learned by means of a confidential
relationship will be protected even though the defendant could
have learned the secret by legitimate means."
It has long been settled in both English and American law that
an action exists for misappropriation and use of a trade secret.
The first case granting injunctive relief was Yovatt v. Winyard,2
decided in England in 1820. Mr. Justice Story declared as early
as 1853 that Equity would restrain a party from disclosing trade
secrets communicated to him in the course of a confidential em-
ployment.3 However, it was not until 1868 in the leading case of
Peabody v. Norfolk,4 that an American court granted an injunc-
tion in a trade secrets case. In that case, the Massachusetts court
introduced both the necessity of a "breach of trust" for actionable
misappropriation of trade secrets, and the troublesome and some-
what discredited' concept of the trade secret as property. The
latter concept was further developed in 1889 by the New York
Court of Appeals 6 and reached its zenith in International News
Service v. Associated Press.7 By calling a trade secret "prop-
erty," the courts were able to grant injunctive relief against
misappropriation on the ground that equity protects property.
This use of the property concept is an example of circulus in
probando: Equity will protect trade secrets because they are
property, and, conversely, trade secrets are property because
equity protects them. Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of DuPont
de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,8 recognized this fallacy and
1. Smith v. Dravo Corporation, 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953). The district
court also found for the defendant on a second ground, patent infringement.
This holding was affirmed on the appeal.
2. 1 Jac. & W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820).
3. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCB 932 (1853).
4. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
5. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100(1917).
6. Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889). For an excellent
discussion of the history of the action, see Barton, A Study in the Law of
Trade Secrets, 13 U. OF CrNN. L. Rnv. 507 (1939).
7. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
8. 244 U.S. 100 (1917). "The word 'property' as applied to trademarks
and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary conse-
quences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary require-
ments of good faith." Id. at 102.
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concluded that the emphasis in a trade secret case should be
placed on the existence and breach of a confidential relationship,
rather than on the legalistic nomenclature of the interest to be
protected.
In the principal case the court does not consider the question
of whether or not a trade secret is property. By completely
eliminating this legal surplusage, the court has taken a progres-
sive step. The court set forth the requirements for a cause of
action for misappropriation of trade secrets :9 1) Existence of a
trade secret, 2) communicated to the defendant, 3) while he was
in a position of trust or confidence, and 4) use by the defendant
to the injury of the plaintiff. Although the court claims to have
taken a different view than Holmes, there is a marked similarity
between the two approaches in that the court in the principal
case also stresses the breach of a confidential relationship. The
court, however, primarily emphasizes the existence of a trade
secret saying, "This is the very basis of plaintiff's claim."'' 1 In
accordance with the view of the Restatement of Torts,11 the court
declares that almost any knowledge or information used by the
plaintiff in its business may be the subject matter of a trade
secret so long as it was acquired by the independent effort of the
plaintiff,12 and that the second aspect of a trade secret is the rela-
tive secrecy of the subject matter." The court points out that, al-
though the information might have been derived from plaintiff's
products which had been marketed, it is still sufficiently secret
to be classified as a trade secret between these parties if the de-
fendant obtained the information surreptitiously. 4 This proposi-
tion substantially modifies the secrecy requirement.
9. Smith v. Dravo Corporation, 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953). The
federal court, sitting in Pennsylvania, used MacBeth-Evans Glass Co. v.
Schelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688 (1912), as declaratory of the local law.
10. Smith v. Dravo Corporation, supra note 9.
11. RESTATmiENT, ToRTs § 757, comment b (1939).
12. Smith v. Dravo Corporation, 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953). The
court's position is sustained by the weight of authority. Victor Chemical
Works v. Iliff, 299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806 (1921); National Tube Co. v.
Eastern Tube Co., 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. R.N.S. 459 (1902). See Barton, supra
note 6, at 521-529.
13. Smith v. Dravo Corporation, supra note 12. See RESTATEMENT. TORTS
§ 757, comment b (1939): "A substantial element of secrecy must exist, so
that . . .there would be difficulty in acquiring the information."
14. Smith v. Dravo Corporation, supra note 12. The court's position is
sustained by the weight of authority. Herold v. Herold China & Pottery Co.,
257 Fed. 911 (6th Cir. 1919); Radium Remedies Co. v. Weiss, 173 Minn.
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Unless a confidential relationship exists there can not be a
trade secret, although the information is the proper subject mat-
ter upon which to base injunctive relief.15 Thus, if the informa-
tion were obtained by legitimate methods, such as an examination
of the plaintiff's marketed products, no protection would be given
the trade secret.
It is clear that the information misused by the defendant in
the principal case was obtained through a confidential relation-
ship. Therefore, the four step approach used by this court is
adequate to arrive at the correct result ;16 but it is a more indirect
route than that advocated by Holmes, which penetrates immedi-
ately to the question of whether there has been a breach of a
confidential relationship.
It is submitted that a better approach would be: 1) Did the
defendant occupy a position of trust or confidence to the plaintiff,
2) which was breached by the defendant, 3) to obtain informa-
tion of a business or commercial nature, 4) which was used by
the defendant to the detriment of the plaintiff? This approach
would emphasize the breach of the confidential relationship,
rather than the "existence of a trade secret."
WILLS-DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION
La Croix v. Senecal, 99 A.2d 115 (Conn. 1953).
Testatrix died leaving a will and codicil. Although the codicil
expressly revoked the residuary clause of the will, and substituted
a new residuary clause, the only change made by the codicil was
to eliminate the possibility of any uncertainty as to the identity
342, 217 N.W. 339 (1928); Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co.,
72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 Atl. 339 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907); Tabor v. Hoffman,
118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889) ; Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Co., 69 Misc. 90, 124 N.Y. Supp. 956 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Pressed Steel
Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 Atl. 4 (1904); RESTATF-
MENT, TORTS § 757," comment b (1939). But cf. Bristol v. Equitable Life
Ins. Co., 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506 (1892).
15. Stewart v. Hock, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S.E. 369 (1903) ; Chadwick v. Covell,
151 Mass. 190, 23 N.E. 1068 (1890); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23
N.E. 12 (1889); See Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co.,
172 F.2d 150 (1949).
16. The second and fourth steps used in the approach to the problem by
the court in the principal case, that the subject matter was communicated
to the defendant and that such information was used by the defendant to
the detriment of the plaintiff, do not provide any difficult questions of law
in this case.
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